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Abstract Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one
and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That
one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of
identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary
claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two
shoes; and my one body is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso.
The pair of shoes is not identical with each one of the two shoes, nor is my body
identical with each one of its six limbs, but rather identical with all of them taken
together, or collectively. I argue that the problem of the Trinity should be understood
accordingly: God is identical with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
collectively, but not with each one of them distributively. According to the way I
develop this proposal, no traditional laws of identity are violated, but merely
generalized in an intuitive way. I argue that this is compatible with Christian
Orthodoxy as given by the Athanasian Creed. I end by responding to some
anticipated objections.
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The logical problem of the Trinity threatens Christianity with incoherence.1 Many
solutions have been suggested, but arguably without much removal of the threat.2 In
SOPHIA (2011) 50:363–374
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1I henceforth assume that a Christian strives for (at least) true belief and that truth requires coherency.
2For a survey plus references, see, e.g., Tuggy (2009) and Rea (2009). See also Brower and Rea (2005a).
For a good presentation and discussion of the logical problem, see Cartwright (1987). For some fairly
interesting and sophisticated, but in my mind ultimately incoherent solutions, see Geach (1967),
Swinburne (1994), and Brower and Rea (2005b).
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what follows I suggest a new and independently motivated solution to it. As far as I
can tell, it is a coherent one.
The Logical Problem
The logical problem is that according to Christian orthodoxy God is the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit, but the Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, nor is
the Holy Spirit the Son. For example, according to the Athanasian Creed, which I
will henceforth take as representing Christian Orthodoxy:
the Catholic faith is this: that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in
unity; neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. For there
is one person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy
Spirit. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is
all one, the glory equal, the majesty coeternal. Such as the Father is, such
is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit. The Father uncreated, the Son
uncreated, and the Holy Spirit uncreated. The Father incomprehensible, the
Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Spirit incomprehensible. The Father
eternal, the Son, eternal, and the Holy Spirit eternal. And yet they are not
three eternals, but one eternal. As also there are not three uncreated nor
three incomprehensible, but one uncreated and one incomprehensible. So
likewise the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, and the Holy Spirit
almighty. And yet they are not three almighties, but one almighty. So the
Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. And yet they are
not three Gods, but one God. So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son is
Lord, and the Holy Spirit is Lord. And yet there are not three Lords, but
one Lord. For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to
acknowledge every person by himself to be God and Lord; so are we
forbidden by the catholic religion to say there are three Gods or three
Lords. … And in this Trinity none is afore or after another; none is greater
or less than another. But the whole three persons are coeternal, and coequal.
So that in all things, as aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in
Unity is to be worshipped.
According to one interpretation then, Christian orthodoxy asks us to believe in the
following set of propositions3:
1. God = the Father
2. God = the Son
3. God = the Holy Spirit
4. The Father ≠ the Son
5. The Father ≠ the Holy Spirit
6. The Holy Spirit ≠ the Son
3 This is, for example, how Brower and Rea (2005a, b) interpret the creed.
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But this set is inconsistent in the sense that it leads to paradox in virtue of the
classical logic of identity. This logic of identity is given by the following two
axioms:
7. For any x and y, if x = y, then x and y share all properties
8. For any x, x = x
From which we can trivially prove the following two theorems:
9. For any x and y, if x = y, then y = x
10. For any x, y, and z, if x = y and y = z, then x = z
Which implies what we might call the Trinitarian Paradox: (for example) by
propositions 1 and 9 it immediately follows that
11. The Father = God
By propositions 11, 2, and 10 it immediately follows that
12. The Father = the Son
The conjunction of propositions 12 and 4 is a direct contradiction. Q.E.D.
The Solution
With no further restrictions on our concept of God, the paradox might be taken to
have the trivial polytheistic solution that there are in fact three gods, not one. But
this violates the Athanasian Creed according to which we must “worship one God in
Trinity and Trinity in Unity,” and according to which “yet there are not three Gods,
but one God.” Christian orthodoxy is thus monotheistic:
13. There is one and only one God
Any solution to the Trinitarian Paradox must thus be compatible with 13 in order
not to violate such orthodoxy.
With proposition 13 in place, we also have another paradox, which we might call
the Paradox of the Cardinals: by 1–6 it follows that God is (at least) three in number,
namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each being distinct from each other.
But by 13, God is one in number, not three. Hence, God is one in number and God is
not one in number. Q.E.D.
I will now for expository reasons propose a solution to the Paradox of the
Cardinals before I go on to propose a solution to the Trinitarian Paradox. I end, in
the next and last section, by responding to some anticipated objections.
Consider my body. Referring to it, one might say with equal truth both that it is a
body and that it is two arms, two legs, one head and a torso. In so doing one isn’t
referring to two distinct referents, or portions of reality, but rather to one and the
same portion of reality divided up in two different ways. One such way is as one
body, while the other is as two arms, two legs, one head, and a torso. Or, as Quine
(1960:91) puts it with another, but similar example: ‘shoes’ and ‘pair of shoes’ range
over exactly the same scattered stuff, and differ from one another solely in that they
divide their reference differently. The important point for our purposes isn’t exactly
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how we manage to divide one and the same portion of reality in two (or more)
different ways, but rather that we in fact do so all the time. And we obviously do.
For example, we say things like: The team was awesome today! They played
amazingly well. And: that (one) kilometer is a thousand meters. And: my body just is
those particles arranged body-wise. What’s happened in such cases is that on the
one hand we have referred to one thing, while in the next breath referred to that very
thing as a plurality of things instead. No one should claim that in such cases we must
always switch referent from first be talking about some one thing to then be talking
about some many things, which aren’t the same portion of reality as the one thing.
That would be incredible. Rather, one should claim that what has happened is just
that there is a switch between the way we thought of, or conceptualized one and the
same portion of reality, not in what portion of reality we referred to. Frege (1884:59)
provides another example:
While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can say with equal
truth both “It is a copse” and “It is five trees”, or both “Here are four
companies” and “Here are 500 men”. Now what changes here from one
judgment to the other is neither any individual object, nor the whole, the
agglomeration of them, but rather my terminology. But that is itself only a sign
that one concept has been substituted for another.4
The implication is that numerical properties are relational properties.5 Having a
certain numerical property (cardinality) depends on how it has been divided up, or
conceptualized to begin with. Conceptualizing some portion of reality as two arms,
two legs, one head, and a torso, it has the numerical property six holding true of it,
but conceptualizing the same portion of reality as a body. it has the numerical
property one holding true of it. Independently of being conceptualized it has no
particular numerical property holding true of it at all.
Likewise with God: conceptualizing the portion of reality that is God as the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we have conceptualized it as being three in
number, but it is nonetheless the same portion of reality as what we might
conceptualize as God, and hence as being one in number. Numerical properties aren’t
properties holding of it independently of how it is being conceptualized. This is of
course not saying that one conceptualization cannot be better somehow than another,
nor that they cannot be equally good. It is only saying that, better, worse, or equal, it
is a conceptualization of one and the same portion of reality either way.
4 This is also, for example, how St Thomas Aquinas (1253-55/1993: 240) thinks of things: “as a single
real (geometrical) point may truly correspond to several conceptions we frame of it: conceived of in itself,
conceived of as a (circle’s) centre, conceived of as the end of a line. All these conceptions are in the mind
as subject, yet in the point itself as giving a basis to the truth of the conceptions.” It is also how Descartes
(1985:227) thinks of the relation between corporeal substances and regions of space: “There is no real
distinction between space, or internal place, and the corporeal substance contained in it; the only
difference lies in the way in which we are accustomed to conceive of them.” There are plenty other
examples, but the general idea should by now be clear enough.
5 Frege (1884) concludes that numerical properties are second-level properties, i.e., properties of concepts,
not of the “external phenomenon” falling under the concepts. For reasons I cannot go into here, I suggest
instead that numerical properties are indeed first-level properties, properties of the “external phenomenon,”
but relational such properties, with a concept as the relational unit.
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This solves the Paradox of the Cardinals because it is not true that God is one in
number and that God is not one in number, simpliciter. Rather, what is true is that
God is one in number relative to one way of conceptualizing that portion of reality
that He is, but not one in number relative to another way of conceptualizing it. We
thus get the logical form: One(x,y) & not-One(x,z), which is not a contradiction
(where ‘x’ here ranges over portions of reality and ‘y’ and ‘z’ ranges over concepts).
The trick to solve the Trinitarian Paradox is now to collapse 1–3 into the
following proposition:
14. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit,
where ‘God’ is a singular term, and ‘the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit’ is a plural term,
both referring to one and the same portion of reality, albeit conceptualized differently.
The further trick is to read ‘=’ collectively, not distributively. That is, God is identical
with neither the Father nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but rather God is identical with
all of them taken together: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit collectively.6
An ordinary example will make the point clear. Consider three things a, b, and c
surrounding one thing x. It is then true that a,b,c taken together or collectively
surround x, but not true that a surrounds x, and it is not true that b surrounds x, and it
is not true that c surrounds x. To solve the Trinitarian Paradox, we simply treat
identity like that; hence, the collective reading of proposition 14.
Collapsing 1–3 into 14 is no (obvious) violation of Christian orthodoxy. First,
proposition 14 is in perfect alignment with the Athanasian Creed where it demands
that we worship “one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the
persons nor dividing the substance.” Second, note the pattern in the creed:
Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit. The Father
uncreated, the Son uncreated, and the Holy Spirit uncreated. The Father
incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Spirit incomprehen-
sible. The Father eternal, the Son, eternal, and the Holy Spirit eternal. And yet they
are not three eternals, but one eternal. As also there are not three uncreated nor
three incomprehensible, but one uncreated and one incomprehensible. So likewise
the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, and the Holy Spirit almighty. And yet they
are not three almighties, but one almighty. So the Father is God, the Son is God,
and the Holy Spirit is God. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.
It has the predicative form:
& The Father is F, the Son is F, and the Holy Spirit is F. And yet they are not three
Fs, but one F
where F is uncreated, incomprehensible, eternal, almighty, and God, respectively.
Seeing the predicative pattern in the first four cases, there is no reason to read the
last case, according to which each three persons are God, as being a case of
numerical identity. Following the predicative pattern, there is instead all the reason to
read the last case too as being a case of the ‘is’ of predication, rather than the ‘is’ of
identity. This is also the most simple and reasonable way to avoid contradicting the
6 This distinction between a collective and a distributive reading of predicates is common in natural
languages as well as in standard plural logic. See, e.g., Yi (2005, 2006) or McKay (2006).
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last sentence: “yet they are not three Gods, but one God.” Or so I claim.7
My solution to the Trinitarian Paradox is thus that we should understand Christian
orthodoxy as asking us to believe in the following set of propositions (among many
others):
15. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit
16. The Father ≠ the Son
17. The Father ≠ the Holy Spirit
18. The Holy Spirit ≠ the Son
Which is a consistent set of propositions in conjunction with the classical laws of
identity as long as proposition 14/15 is read collectively, not distributively.8 This set of
propositions is a very simple and sufficiently good expression of the core demand in
the Athanasian Creed, according to which we must worship Trinity in Unity and Unity
in Trinity, but neither confound the persons nor divide the substance. It is also, as I
have argued, compatible with the rest of the creed. This set of propositions is also
consistent with monotheism, i.e., with proposition 13 according to which there is one
and only one God. Of course, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three, not
one, but proposition 13 implies no denial of that fact. Orthodoxy recognizes that they
are three and not confounded with each other through its acceptance of 4-6/16-18. It is
when conceptualized as God that He is one, undivided in substance.
Some Objections
I anticipate at least six objections, but first note four general features of my solution.
First, the topics of plural identity and the nature of numerical properties are, as
shown by the examples given above, general logical and metaphysical topics in their
own right. My solution is therefore not motivated solely by the problem of the
Trinity, and hence cannot legitimately be accused of being an objectionably ad hoc
such solution.9
Second, my solution is not a version of modalism, the heretic view according to
which the three persons are mere “appearances” or “modes” of the one God.
According to my solution, the three persons are real divine existences in their own
right.
Third, it is not a version of subordinationism, the heretical view according to
which there is some sort of ordering relation among the three persons with respect to
their divinity. For all my solution says, it might be the case that the Son is begotten
by the Father and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, but
nonetheless that each of the three persons is the same with respect to their divine
features. For all my solution says, it might also be the case that there is no priority
relation between God and the three persons; the one might be on a par with the three.
7 Cf. the exchange between Wierenga (2004) and Brower (2004).
8 That is, my account relies on the plural versions of Leibniz’s Law: if xx = yy, then xx and yy share all
properties, and Reflexivity: xx = xx, where each plural variable takes a plurality consisting of one or more
things as its value. These plural versions entail the classical singular versions. For more details on the
plural notion of identity, see Bohn, E. D. (manuscript submitted), On Treating Composition as Identity.
9 As, for example, van Inwagen’s (1995) solution arguably is.
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Fourth, it is neither a version of so-called Latin Trinitarianism (LT) nor so-called
Social Trinitarianism (ST).10 Roughly, LT takes its starting point in the one and only
God, and then tries to explain the three persons in Him, i.e., tries to explain how the
one and only God is three persons. (Its main challenge is to avoid modalism, which
my solution avoids.) ST on the other hand (again roughly) takes its starting point in
the three persons, and then tries to explain the one and only God in them, i.e., tries to
explain how they are one God. (Its main challenge is to avoid polytheism, which my
solution avoids, but more on that below.) By identifying the one and only God with
the three persons collectively in the way I suggested above, one neither takes its
starting point in God nor in the three persons. By being identical, God and the three
persons (collectively) are on a par in all senses of the term, and hence not sensibly
explained in each other. It is important to note that my solution is to be understood
literally: the one God is identical with the three persons (collectively), and the three
persons (collectively) are identical with the one God. As shown above, this is not
contradictory on the condition that numerical properties (or predications, if you
prefer) are relational properties (predications).11
My solution thus also avoids more general objections to ST and LT as such. To
partly support this further claim, consider some objections to both these forms of
Trinitarianism put forth by Dale Tuggy. Tuggy (2003) objects that ST fails because it
identifies God with a community of three divine persons, but since a community is
neither a person nor divine, it turns out, according to ST, that God is neither a person
nor divine. But that God is neither a person nor divine contradicts the scriptures. My
solution identifies God with a portion of reality that can equally well be
conceptualized as a plurality of three divine persons. There is no privileged way
of conceptualizing it in terms of which we can explain the other way. Both ways are
equally legitimate. But then God is not a mere “community” (or rather: plurality) as
opposed to a divine person because the relevant portion of reality can equally well
be conceptualized as a divine person, namely God. Recall, my solution is a claim of
strict identity: God is the same portion of reality as the three persons.
As such it also avoids what Tuggy calls the Quaternity Problem, namely that
according to ST there really are four divine persons, not three: the Father, the Son,
the Holy Spirit, and God.12 According to Tuggy (2003:169):
The problem is this: in the New Testament, we encounter three divine and
wonderful personal beings. In those pages there is no additional person called
‘God’ or ‘the Godhead.’
But according to my solution, the divine portion of reality can be conceptualized
as three persons, and as one person, but not, ontologically speaking, as four persons
because the three persons together are the “fourth” person. So, to the extent that we
think of four divine persons, we must be thinking of the same divine portion of
reality “twice over,” much like we can think of my body as both my arms, legs, head
11 Of course, I cannot here fully defend the claim that numerical properties are relational, but see Bohn, E. D.
(manuscript submitted). Note also that my solution can equally well be phrased in terms of numerical predications
being relational rather than numerical properties being so relational. My solution is compatible with nominalism.
12 See also the discussion in Moreland and Craig (2003:589–591).
10 LT is also occasionally called Western or Psychological Trinitarianism, while ST is occasionally called
Greek or Eastern Trinitarianism. See, e.g., Brower and Rea (2005a), Rea (2009), or Tuggy (2009).
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and torso and as a body. We can do so, but it is, ontologically speaking, thinking of
the same thing “twice over,” and as such, for metaphysical purposes, an innocent act.
So, yes, there is a sense in which there are four divine persons, but it is an
ontologically innocent such sense compatible with the New Testament since the
“fourth” person is the three persons collectively.13
Tuggy (2003:171–173) objects to what he calls popular LT by the fact that it
identifies God with each one of the three persons (while upholding that each one of
the three persons are mutually distinct), which violates the classical transitivity of
identity. Obviously, by only employing a collective reading of the identity sign, my
solution does not stumble over this problem (cf. proposition 14). But Tuggy
(2003:173) also objects to what he calls refined LT by the fact that it denies there
being a so-called absolute identity-relation of the form “x is the same as y,” and
instead only accepts a so-called relative identity-relation of the form “x is the same F
as y,” where F is a count-noun.14 According to Tuggy, it is self-evident that there is
an absolute identity-relation of the form “x is the same as y.” My solution does not
deny that there is an absolute identity-relation (cf. footnote 8). According to my
solution it is numerical properties that are relational, not identity. My solution is
simply not one employing relative identity.15
So, from the foregoing, I conclude that my solution falls on neither side of the
often-mentioned distinction between STand LT, and as such avoids the more general
objections raised against each side.
I nonetheless anticipate at least six objections.
First objection: identity is a one-one relation that anything bears to itself and to
nothing else, but your account relies on identity also being a one-many/many-one
relation, which is nonsense, so your solution is gibberish.
Reply: I take it that by my case above I have in fact made sense of how identity
also comes in numerically hybrid forms. But if still unconvinced, then in addition to
just ordinary language, pre-theoretic common sense, and all the passages mentioned
above from Aquinas, Descartes, Frege, and Quine, I further refer the reader to, e.g.,
Plato’s Theaetetus 204, Armstrong (1978:49, 1997:12&18), Baxter (1988a, b),
Lewis (1991:3.6, 1993), Sider (2007), and (Author). All have argued, pace van
Inwagen (1994), that numerically hybrid identity-claims in fact make sense. Since I
am confident that the reader sufficiently understands the claims by then, I do not see
the need to repeat this whole defense here.16
Second objection: your account relies on the notorious thesis of Composition as
Identity as it is found in Armstrong (1978, 1997) and Lewis (1991), but that thesis is
13 And of course, in line with what I argued above, whenever the New Testament talks of any one of the
Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit as being God, we understand this as involving an ‘is’ of predication, not
an ‘is’ of strict numerical identity. But I cannot go into an adequate interpretation of the New Testament
here. But for interesting and related discussions, see Baber (2008), and the exchange between Tuggy
(2004, 2011) and Hasker (2010, 2011). See also my last reply to the sixth objection discussed in Sect. 3
below. As for Tuggy’s (2004) Deception Arguments I find them to be very interesting, but not to be a
problem for my account as such. Rather they are everyone’s problem.
14 Tuggy has Geach (1967) in mind here.
15 As per Geach (1967), or as per the somewhat watered-down version of it found in, e.g., Brower and Rea
(2005b). Personally, I agree with Tuggy in that Geach’s solution implies the denial of something that seems
self-evident, if anything is.
16 Bohn, E. D. (manuscript submitted) in particular has replied to all the worries found in van Inwagen (1994).
370 E.D. Bohn
false, as shown by, e.g., van Inwagen (1994), Merricks (2003:20–28), Sider (2007),
McDaniel (2008), and Cameron (2007, Forthcoming), so your account is false.
Reply: my account does not in fact rely on Composition as Identity as it is found
in the works of Armstrong and Lewis, so the falsity of that thesis does not in fact
entail the falsity of the present solution to the problem of the Trinity. A careful reader
will have noticed that nowhere above have I used the mereological notions of
composition, parthood, proper parthood, etc. I have only relied on a primitive notion
of plural identity, not mereological notions. Obviously, relying on a primitive
concept of identity is not thereby relying on the extremely controversial thesis of
Composition as Identity. Now, personally I do believe that one can interpret the
purely formal mereological notions of composition, parthood, proper parthood, etc.,
in terms of the above-used primitive notion of plural identity. But nothing in my
present solution to the problem of the Trinity relies on this fact.17 My solution is
compatible with all (substantial) talk of parthood being simply false (i.e.,
mereological nihilism).
Third objection: fine, so your account doesn’t rely on mereological notions, but it
does nonetheless imply that God is a complex substance, which is false on Christian
orthodoxy, according to which God is a simple and undivided substance.
Reply: no, it implies no such thing. According to my solution, the divine portion
of reality is both one God and three persons, but it is only when it is conceptualized
as the latter that it is divided into three. On my account, it is thus simply false that
God, so conceptualized, is three (or that the three persons, so conceptualized, are
one), and hence simply false thatGod is divided in substance (or that the three persons
are not divided into three persons). The only way we can make sense of such claims is
by using the singular word (or term) ‘God,’ but really be thinking of it or
conceptualizing it through the plural concept of the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit; or be using the plural word (or term) ‘the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,’
but really be thinking of it or conceptualizing it through the singular concept of God.
But in any such case God is still undivided in substance. Recall, my solution is to be
taken literally: numerical properties are relational properties, so when the divine
portion of reality is (correctly) conceptualized as one God, there is one substance there,
not more than one (assuming the Athanasian Creed has it right, of course). Ascribing
relational properties, numerical ascriptions are simply incomplete independent of or
prior to their relational units being correctly in place, namely a legitimate
conceptualization of the portion of reality to which the numerical property is ascribed.
That being said, I am not sure how much should be attached to the idea that God
is simple because I am not sure to what extent we are capable of understanding him
as being simple. Doesn’t God have more than one thought, and hence in some way
or other have more than one part? Doesn’t God also have complex thoughts, and
hence in some way or other is himself complex?
Fourth objection: fine, so your account entails that God is one in number, not
three, and that the three persons are three in number, not one, but on your account we
17 What’s more, the version of Composition as Identity that results from the way that I personally believe
we can interpret the mereological notions does not fall prey to any of the objections found in van Inwagen
(1994), Merricks (2003), Sider (2007), McDaniel (2008), and Cameron (2007, Forthcoming). I cannot of
course argue for this bold and general claim here, but see Bohn, E. D. (manuscript submitted).
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can equally well conceptualize the divine portion of reality as being n in number, for
any number n, which is false according to Christian orthodoxy.
Reply: no, not anything goes. Just like conceptualizing a woman as a witch does
not make her into one, so conceptualizing the divine portion of reality as being n in
number, for any number n, does not make it into n things. Which conceptualizations
are correct and which ones aren’t is partly up to reality itself in the sense that it partly
depends on its objective structure (or at least so I here assume). According to
Christianity, the divine portion of reality isn’t n things, for any number n, so if we are
to believe Christianity we must not believe that the divine portion of reality is n
things because then if Christianity were right, we would be wrong.
This last reply also goes to show that my solution is not committed to a form of
metaphysical anti-realism. That numerical properties are relational properties with
concepts as their relational units is compatible with reality having a real and
objective numerical structure. It might be that some of the concepts (as opposed to
others) are objectively more natural to be used to get at the “fundamental” numerical
structure of reality without thereby making all other numerical concepts inapplica-
ble.18 This of course further goes to show that metaphysical realism does not entail
that numerical properties aren’t thus relational: even if reality has a most natural and
“fundamental” numerical structure, numerical properties might still be relational.19
Fifth objection: fine, but concepts are mental entities, so your account is at least
committed to reality’s numerical structure, objective or not, being partly dependent
on human mentality.
Reply: that depends on the metaphysical status of concepts, and their relations to
human beings in particular. Since that’s everyone’s issue, I need take no particular
stand on it here.
Sixth objection: fine then, but if you are such a metaphysical realist, what reason
do we have on your account for thinking that ‘God’ singularly refers to an undivided
substance, and not instead plurally refers to, say, the three persons of the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit? The former kind of singular reference is of course needed
to avoid polytheism.
Reply: this brings to light an interesting issue, but is an unfair objection to my
account in particular. The semantics of ‘God,’ ‘Father,’ ‘Son,’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ is
everyone’s issue, not mine in particular.20 My account seems compatible with
whatever biblical scholars and semanticists might find out about it, as long as the
numerical identity of God does not distribute across the three persons (‘God’
referring to each of the persons). Most importantly, my account is compatible with
‘God’ referring to a substance, and ‘the Father,’ ‘the Son,’ and ‘the Holy Spirit’ each
referring to distinct divine persons.
It is worth noting at the end that my solution is even compatible with what at
times seems to be indicated in the New Testament, and argued by Tuggy (2004),
namely that God = the Father (or that ‘God’ refers to the Father, but not to the Son or
18 Cf., e.g., Lewis (1986:59–69) and Sider (2009).
19 In the case of God versus the three divine persons, I believe the Athanasian Creed is pretty clear on both
ways being equally natural/fundamental. But let that be as it may for present purposes.
20 Cf. Baber (2008).
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the Holy Spirit by virtue of neither one of them being the Father). If so, on my
solution we get the following two propositions:
(19) God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit (14/15 above)
(20) God = the Father (New Thesis)
But propositions 19 and 20 are mutually compatible by simple plural logic: by 20,
19 becomes the Father = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, which trivially
collapses into the Father = the Son, the Holy Spirit, which if read collectively (in
accordance with my suggested solution) is compatible with propositions 16–18
above (i.e., that each one of the three persons are numerically distinct).21
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